NEUTROSOPHIC GAMES AS A TOOL FOR SOLUTION MODELING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS CONCERNING INVESTMENTS (ICSID)

Abstract

The International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) is an organization based in Washington, United States
belonging to the World Bank, whose objective is the support to resolve conflicts between States. Three South American countries, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, at certain times have decided to leave this organism. This paper aims to determine the best strategy to follow for these countries to make the most convenient decision about to leave or not this organization. The solution of this problem is done by applying neutrosophic games. Game Theory is used to solve conflict situations among different parties. In this paper, neutrosophic games are non-cooperative, in normal form, two players and zero sum games. Inaddition, evaluations are carried out with linguistic terms associated with neutrosophic sets, where indeterminacy is part of the calculations and this is the reason for including neutrosophic sets in modeling this problem. Obviously, in a dispute there is uncertainty and also lack of information, contradictions among the parties, inconsistencies, and other phenomena which justify the use of neutrosophy.