INFORMATION EXCHANGES IN COURNOT OLIGOPOLIES

Authors

  • J. Andrés Faíña Medín Chair in European Industrial Economics
  • Jean Monnet Chair in European Industrial Economics
  • Jesús López Rodríguez Economic Analysis Department, School of Economics and Business Administration, University of A Coruña, A Coruña
  • José López Rodríguez Economic Analysis Department, School of Economics and Business Administration, University of A Coruña, A Coruña

Keywords:

information exchange, Cournot equilibrium, accuracy effect, intercept demand uncertainty

Abstract

In this work we analyse the profitability of information sharing among Cournot oligopolists receiving private information about a random demand. We model the random demand as a linear demand having an unknown intercept. In this scenario, firms observe private signals about the unknown parameter. We show that if the private signal observed by firms is accuracy enough, information exchange is profitable

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Published

2023-06-20

How to Cite

Faíña Medín, J. A., Monnet, J., López Rodríguez, J., & López Rodríguez, J. (2023). INFORMATION EXCHANGES IN COURNOT OLIGOPOLIES. Investigación Operacional, 24(1). Retrieved from https://revistas.uh.cu/invoperacional/article/view/6763

Issue

Vol. 24 No. 1 (2003): Investigacion Operacional

Section

Articles

License

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

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